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Abstract—A smart meter (SM) periodically measures end-user
electricity consumption and reports it to a utility provider (UP).
Despite the advantages of SMs, their use leads to serious concerns
about consumer privacy. In this paper, SM privacy is studied by
considering the presence of an energy harvesting device (EHD)
as a means of masking the user’s input load. The user can
satisfy part or all of his/her energy needs from the EHD, and
hence, less information can be leaked to the UP via the SM. The
EHD is typically equipped with a rechargeable energy storage
device, i.e., a battery, whose instantaneous energy content limits
the user’s capability in covering his/her energy usage. Privacy
is measured by the information leaked about the user’s real
energy consumption when the UP observes the energy requested
from the grid, which the SM reads and reports to the UP.
The minimum information leakage rate is characterized as a
computable information theoretic single-letter expression when
the EHD battery capacity is either infinite or zero. Numerical
results are presented for a discrete binary input load to illustrate
the potential privacy gains from the existence of a storage device.
I. INTRODUCTION
The transition from a conventional power distribution net-
work to a smart grid is a necessity, not only to replace a less
efficient system, but also to address new environmental and
societal challenges. Smart grids provide many advantages for
energy generation, transmission, distribution and consumption,
and also allow the integration of renewable energy sources
into the power network [1]. A key element of a smart grid is
the smart meter (SM), which records minutely the electricity
consumption of a user, thereby permitting accurate estimation
and control of the smart grid’s behavior.
However, SMs may have unintended consequences regard-
ing the privacy of users. The information collected and dis-
tributed inside the smart grid, namely the load profile of the
users, can potentially be used for other purposes, thereby
raising the question of data security and privacy. From the
load consumption profiles, i.e., the series of energy usage
values that are regularly collected from a user, nonintrusive
appliance load monitoring (NALM) techniques can be used to
identify the user’s habits, such as whether he/she is at home,
the equipment he/she is using, and even the TV channel he/she
is watching [2].
Privacy of SM data has recently become a topic of consider-
able research interest and many solutions have been proposed.
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In [3] the authors designed an anonymization system by
introducing two separate SM identities (IDs), and only the
low frequency ID is released to the utility provider (UP). Bohli
et al. [4] considered the aggregation of information to cover
individual energy consumption information. Other approaches
are to mask the data by obfuscating it, as in [5] and [6], or to
use homomorphic encryption, as in [7].
However, we note that the above techniques, all based on the
manipulation of the SM readings, suffer from a further privacy
risk. The energy consumed by a user is provided directly from
the grid, which is fully controlled by the UP, and hence, the
UP can easily embed additional meters to monitor the energy
requested by a household or a business, in order to receive
accurate information about the energy consumption without
relying on SM readings. To cope with this issue an alternative
approach is to directly modify the actual energy consumption
profile of the user, rather than simply distorting the data sent
to the UP. This can be done, for example, by using an energy
storage device, as in [8], [9] and [10], or by introducing an
alternative energy source (AES), as proposed in [10], [11], [12]
and [13]. We adopt the latter approach, and focus on providing
privacy by using an energy harvesting device (EHD) with a
rechargeable energy storage component, which we duly call
a battery. A similar model, studied in [13], imposes only an
average power constraint on the energy the user can receive
from the AES, which can be a microgrid, capable of providing
any amount of energy at each time instant. The average power
constraint may be imposed to limit the cost of the energy
received from the AES. However, if the AES is an EHD with
a battery, it may not be possible to control the amount of
energy harvested at each time instant. Hence, since the energy
available in the battery imposes limitations on the capability
of the energy management unit (EMU) to reduce information
leakage to the UP, it is important to take into account the size
and state of the battery when designing an energy management
policy.
We study the minimum amount of user’s energy con-
sumption information leaked to the UP, under instantaneous
power constraints. We provide single-letter expressions for
the minimum information leakage rate when the EHD battery
capacity is either infinite or zero. In the case of discrete input
load distributions, the minimization problem can be shown to
be convex, and hence, it can be solved efficiently by numerical
Fig. 1. The system model. Xt, Yt and Et are the user input load, the output
load, and the energy harvested by the EHD at time t, respectively.
methods, such as the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm. Finally, we
provide simulation results for a binary input load distribution.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II we introduce the system model, and in Sections
III and IV we consider the case of infinite and zero battery
capacity, respectively. In Section V we simulate the system by
considering a discrete binary input load distribution. Finally,
conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the discrete time system depicted in Fig. 1,
where each discrete time represents a time slot. The input load
Xt ∈ X is the energy requested by the user in time slot t, while
Yt ∈ Y is the energy received from the UP, i.e., the output
load. We assume that the entries of the input load sequence,
{Xt}
∞
t=1, are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
with distribution pX . In time slot t − 1, the EHD harvests
Et ∈ E units of energy from the environment, which become
available to the EMU at the beginning of time slot t. The
unused energy is then stored in a battery, whose maximum
capacity is Bmax. The harvested energy sequence, {Et}∞t=1,
is modelled as having i.i.d. entries with distribution pE . We
define the average value of the harvested energy in each time
slot as P¯E = E[E].
The EMU satisfies the user’s energy demand in all time
slots from either the UP or the EHD. We do not allow extra
energy to be drawn from the grid and then wasted. This could
provide additional privacy to the user, albeit at a significantly
higher energy cost. Also, the user cannot get energy from the
grid and store it in the EHD battery. Hence, we have Yt ≤ Xt,
and Xt−Yt denotes the amount of energy the EMU gets from
the EHD in time slot t. Let St ∈ [0, Bmax] denote the state
of the battery at the beginning of time slot t. We have
St+1 = max{min{St + Et − (Xt − Yt), Bmax}, 0}, (1)
where St+1 denotes the state of the battery at the beginning
of time slot t+ 1.
By measuring the privacy of a user, it is possible to
compare effectively different privacy-preserving strategies and
use the best one. However, coming up with a universal privacy
measure is elusive. Previous works have explored various
measures. Kalogridis et al. [8] considered the Kullback-Leibler
divergence between the input and output loads, cluster classi-
fication for the input load and regression analysis. The authors
in [14] computed the number of features, i.e., the number
of events that indicate whether a device is switched on or
off, and the empirical entropy, considered as an upper bound
on the information extractable via a NALM procedure. The
studies in [9], [10] and [11] considered mutual information
between the input and output loads as a measure of information
leakage. Similarly, we also minimize the mutual information
rate between Xn and Y n. We note that mutual information as a
privacy measure is not limited by technology implementations
or the complexity of the NALM procedure, and allows us to
provide provable bounds on the achievable privacy.
We aim at designing energy management policies that will
decide on the amount of energy to request from the UP in
every time slot t, given the input load up to time t, Xt, the
energy requested from the UP up to time t − 1, Y t−1, and
the state sequence of the battery St. Our goal is to minimize
the information leakage rate, i.e., the average of the mutual
information between the input and output load sequences.
A. Definitions
Definition 1. A length-n energy management policy is com-
posed of, possibly random, power allocation functions
ft : X
t × Yt−1 × St → Y, (2)
for t = 1, ..., n, such that 0 ≤ Yt ≤ Xt and the battery state
evolves according to (1).
Definition 2. The privacy achieved by a length-n energy
management policy is measured via the information leakage
rate defined as
In =
1
n
I (Xn;Y n) . (3)
Definition 3. An information leakage rate I is said to be
achievable if there exists a sequence of energy management
policies such that limn→∞ In ≤ I .
Definition 4. For an SM system with given pX , pE and Bmax,
the minimum privacy leakage rate I is defined as the infimum
of the achievable information leakage rates.
In [13] the SM privacy problem is studied with the assump-
tion that the EMU is only constrained by the average and
peak values of the energy it can request from the AES. Note
that this is a more relaxed problem compared to evaluating
the minimum information leakage rate in the presence of
a battery. The privacy-power function, I(P¯ , Pˆ ) is defined
in [11] as the minimum information leakage rate that can
be achieved when the energy management policy satisfies
E[ 1
n
∑n
t=1(Xt − Yt)] ≤ P¯ and 0 ≤ Xt − Yt ≤ Pˆ .
Theorem 1. [11, Theorem 1] The privacy-power function
I(P¯ , Pˆ ) for an i.i.d. input load vector X with distribution
pX(x), when the average and peak values of the power
provided by the AES are limited by P¯ and Pˆ , respectively,
is given by
I(P¯ , Pˆ ) = inf
pY |X(y|x):0≤E[X−Y ]≤P¯
0≤X−Y≤Pˆ
I (X ;Y ) . (4)
In the following, we compute the minimum information
leakage rate for the infinite and zero battery scenarios.
III. EHD WITH AN INFINITE BATTERY
In this scenario we set Bmax = ∞. This is an extreme
situation that may occur if we consider particularly large
battery sizes compared to the energy harvesting rate P¯E . When
Bmax =∞, the constraints on the energy management policy
are relaxed. In each time slot the EMU is limited by the
available energy in the battery, which is simply the difference
between the total harvested energy up to a certain time and the
total energy that has been requested from the EHD up to that
time. We have the following cumulative energy constraints:
n∑
t=1
(Xt − Yt) ≤
n∑
t=1
Et, ∀n. (5)
The following theorem states that the minimum information
leakage rate when Bmax = ∞ is equivalent to the average
power-constrained scenario; that is, the cumulative constraints
on the EMU policy do not reduce the achievable privacy
compared to the average power-constrained case.
Theorem 2. If Bmax = ∞, the minimum information leakage
rate I∞ for an i.i.d. input load X with distribution pX , and
an energy harvesting process with average power P¯E , is given
by
I∞ , I(P¯E ,∞). (6)
It is shown in [12] that, when the input load alphabet X is
discrete, the output alphabet load alphabet Y can be restricted
to Y = X without loss of optimality. Given this restriction
and the convexity of the privacy-power function, I∞ can be
efficiently evaluated.
It is easy to see that I(P¯E ,∞) is a lower bound on the
minimum information leakage rate under battery constraints,
since this is equivalent to replacing the cumulative energy con-
straints with an average one. Next, we prove the achievability
part of the theorem, and present two distinct schemes that
achieve I∞.
A. Store-and-Hide Scheme
As the name suggests, the store-and-hide scheme consists
of an initial phase, in which all the energy requests of the
user are satisfied from the grid, while the harvested energy
is stored in the EHD battery, and a second phase, during
which the EMU starts using a stochastic policy to decide how
much energy it will request from the EHD. The conditional
probability specified in Theorem 2 is used in the second phase.
Consider n time slots. In the first h(n) time slots, called the
storage phase, no privacy is achieved because all the energy
requested by the user is taken from the grid. In the remaining
n− h(n) time slots, called the hiding phase, the user demand
is satisfied by taking energy from both the grid and the battery,
thus masking the real consumption. We assume that h(n) ∈
o(n), with limn→∞ h(n) = ∞, and limn→∞ n− h(n) =∞.
It is noteworthy that no information about the recharge
process of the battery is required, and all the EMU needs to
know is the average power of the harvesting process, P¯E . It is
then possible to show that the store-and-hide scheme satisfies
the constraints in (5) with probability arbitrarily close to 1 as
long as E[X−Y ] < P¯E . In short, we show that for any ǫ > 0
and sufficiently large n, the following relation holds:
Pr
(
n⋃
k=1
{
k∑
t=1
Et <
k∑
t=1
Xt − Yt
})
≤ ǫ. (7)
This condition affirms that, for arbitrarily large n, the
probability that, at any time slot k, the amount of energy stored
in the battery is less than the energy required by the EMU
will be arbitrarily small. The proof, analogous to that of [15,
Lemma 1], and omitted due to space limitations, requires the
application of the weak and the strong law of large numbers
along with the tail behaviors of sums of i.i.d. random variables.
B. Best-Effort Scheme
In the best-effort scheme the EMU does not wait to request
energy from the EHD; instead, it follows the same stochastic
policy as in the hiding phase of the store-and-hide scheme,
and whenever the requested energy is not available in the EHD
battery, all the input load is satisfied from the grid.
In each time slot t, the EMU, based on the instantaneous
input load Xt, decides on the portion of the input load to be
received from the grid, Yt, using the conditional probability
distribution pY |X , which satisfies E[X − Y ] < P¯E . Then, if
there is enough energy in the battery to satisfy the requested
energy from the EHD, i.e., if the condition St+Et ≥ Xt−Yt is
satisfied, then the EMU gets Xt−Yt units of energy from the
EHD battery, and Yt from the grid; otherwise, all the input
load is satisfied directly from the grid, i.e., Yt = Xt. The
energy in the EHD is thus updated according to the following
relation:
St+1 = St + Et − (Xt − Yt) · 1(St + Et ≥ Xt − Yt), (8)
where 1(St + Et ≥ Xt − Yt) = 1 if St + Et ≥ Xt − Yt, and
0 otherwise.
Note that when there is not enough energy in the battery,
the energy request of the user is satisfied completely by the
UP, leading to the maximum information leakage. To find the
overall information leakage rate, we need to show that these
events happen only for a limited number of time slots. This is
proven in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. In the best-effort scheme, if E[X−Y ] < P¯E , then
the condition St +Et < Xt − Yt holds only for finitely many
time slots as n grows to infinity.
The proof, omitted due to space limitations, is an application
of the strong law of large numbers. It follows from Lemma 1
that the leakage of full information takes place only at finitely
many time slots as n → ∞. Thus, the information leakage
rate is equivalent to that achieved under an average power
constraint.
Remark 1. The two energy management policies described
above achieve the same privacy performance even though they
have some conceptual differences. It is important to remark
that the initial assumption is to have an i.i.d. energy harvesting
process. However, this condition is typically not satisfied. For
instance, if we consider a solar panel as an EHD, the recharge
process is clearly not i.i.d and varies greatly from day to
night, and also over seasons. Thus, an optimal management
strategy similar to the one described in [15] in the dual
problem of capacity determination, can be derived. In that
paper, the authors divide the energy arrivals and expenditures
into periods, consider different average harvesting rates for
every period, and finally maximize the average throughput
over all the periods.
IV. EHD WITHOUT A BATTERY
Here, we focus on the case in which the EHD has no battery
for energy storage, i.e., Bmax = 0. The energy harvested in
time slot t − 1 and available at the beginning of time slot
t, Et, can be considered as the state information. Given Et
and the input load Xt, the EMU decides on the amount of
energy to use from the grid and from the EHD. Thus, this
is an SM system with a stochastic peak power constraint on
the energy that the EMU can obtain from the EHD. This
constraint, represented by Et, is causally known by the EMU,
while the UP may or may not know its realization.
In each time slot t the energy requested from the EHD,
Xt− Yt, is limited by the energy harvested in time slot t− 1,
Et, i.e.,
0 ≤ Xt − Yt ≤ Et, t = 1, ..., n. (9)
Note that, as opposed to the infinite battery scenario in (5),
here the past has no influence on the energy constraints, since
there is no battery, and thus no memory in the system.
We first consider the minimum leakage rate when the EHD
harvests a constant and fixed amount of energy in every time
slot, i.e., E = e. We remark that e is not a random variable,
and is known by both the EMU and the UP. The privacy-
power function is thus obtained by considering only a peak
power constraint on the amount of energy the EMU can request
from the harvester. We denote the corresponding minimum
information leakage rate by I(e), which can be obtained as
a special case of Theorem 1. We state this in the following
corollary as it will be used later.
Corollary 1. If Bmax = 0 and E = e, the privacy-power
function I(e) for an i.i.d. input load X is given by
I(e) = I(e, e). (10)
Corollary 1 follows directly from Theorem 1, by considering
only the peak power constraint.
When the harvested energy E changes randomly over time,
this corresponds to an SM privacy problem with a random
Fig. 2. EHD state information Et available only to the EMU.
state. In this case, we can identify two different scenarios
based on the information available at the UP regarding the
state of the system.
A. EHD State Known only by the EMU
In this scenario, the instantaneous state of the harvested
energy is assumed to be known only at the EMU. However,
we still assume that the UP knows the probability distribution
of the states, i.e., pE . This scenario can occur, for example,
when the EHD models a connection to a secondary grid or a
microgrid, and the primary UP cannot have any information
about the exact amount of energy provided by this AES. Fig.
2 depicts this scenario.
Theorem 3. If Bmax = 0, and the energy available at the
EHD in each time slot, E, is i.i.d. with distribution pE , then
the minimum information leakage rate I0 is given by
I0 , inf
pY |X,E(y|x,e):0≤X−Y≤E
I (X ;Y ) . (11)
Proof: Achievability We consider a conditional proba-
bility distribution pY |X,E(y|x, e) that satisfies the conditions
of Theorem 3 and we generate each Yt independently using
pY |X,E(yt|xt, et). The mutual information leakage rate is
therefore given by I(X ;Y ) whereas the peak power constraint
in Theorem 3 are trivially satisfied.
Converse. We assume that there is a series of power allo-
cation functions that satisfy the peak power constraints. The
information leakage rate of the resulting output load series
satisfies the following chain of inequalities:
1
n
I(Xn;Y n) =
1
n
[H(Xn)−H(Xn|Y n)] (12a)
=
1
n
n∑
t=1
[H(Xt)−H(Xt|X
t−1Y n)] (12b)
≥
1
n
n∑
t=1
[H(Xt)−H(Xt|Yt)] (12c)
=
1
n
n∑
t=1
I (Xt;Yt) (12d)
≥
1
n
n∑
t=1
inf
pY |X,E(y|x,e):0≤X−Y≤E
I (X ;Y ) (12e)
= inf
pY |X,E(y|x,e):0≤X−Y≤E
I (X ;Y ) (12f)
= I0, (12g)
where (12c) follows as conditioning reduces entropy; (12e)
follows because whatever strategy the EMU adopts, I (Xt;Yt)
Fig. 3. State information Et available to the EMU and the UP.
can never be smaller than the minimum of the mutual infor-
mation over all conditional probability distribution functions
pY |X,E(y|x, e) that satisfy the peak power constraint; and
(12g) follows from the definition of I0.
Theorem 3 suggests that the minimum information leakage
rate in the absence of a storage device at the EHD can be
characterized as the solution of a single-letter information
theoretic optimization problem. Similarly to the privacy-power
function with average and peak power constraints in (4), when
the input load is discrete, the output load can be limited to the
input load without loss of optimality, and the infimum becomes
a minimum, which can be computed efficiently.
B. EHD State Information Known at the UP
We now assume that the state Et of the EHD is known
by the UP as well as the EMU (Fig. 3). This is a worst-case
situation and we expect that the amount of leaked information
in this case is greater than or equal to that of the previous
scenario, in which only the EMU knows the current state of
the harvested energy. This situation can occur, for example,
if the EHD is a solar panel, and the UP can estimate the
harvested energy accurately from the weather forecast of the
area and the specifications of the solar panel.
The privacy-power function when the harvested energy is
i.i.d. with distribution pE and Bmax = 0, is provided in the
next theorem. We denote this quantity as I¯0.
Theorem 4. If Bmax = 0, the input load is i.i.d. with
distribution pX and the state of the harvested energy is
available at the UP, then the minimum information leakage
rate I¯0 is given by
I¯0 = inf
pY |X,E(y|x,e):0≤X−Y≤E
I (X ;Y |E) = EE [I(E)]. (13)
Proof: Achievability follows trivially, as in Theorem 3.
Converse. We assume that there is a series of power alloca-
tion functions that satisfy the peak power constraints. We then
want to show that the information leakage rate of the resulting
output load series is lower bounded by the value given in (13).
The following chain of inequalities applies:
1
n
I(Xn;Y n|En) =
1
n
[H(Xn|En)−H(Xn|Y n, En)]
=
1
n
n∑
t=1
[H(Xt|Et)−H(Xt|X
t−1Y nEn)] (14a)
≥
1
n
n∑
t=1
[H(Xt|Et)−H(Xt|YtEt)] (14b)
=
1
n
n∑
t=1
|E|∑
k=1
pekI (Xt;Yt|Et = ek) (14c)
≥
1
n
n∑
t=1
|E|∑
k=1
pekI (ek) (14d)
=
|E|∑
k=1
pekI (ek) (14e)
= EE [I(E)] , (14f)
where (14b) follows as conditioning reduces entropy; (14c)
follows from considering all the states ek; and (14d) follows
from the definition of I(e) in (10).
Theorem 4 suggests that the minimum information leakage
rate I¯0 is the expected value of the privacy-power function
with peak power constraint over the distribution of the states.
We have the following inequality between the privacy power
function I¯(e) and I(e,∞), where the latter is the minimum
information leakage rate with an average power constraint e:
I¯(e) ≥ I (e,∞) . (15)
Similarly, the following inequality also holds:
I¯0 = EE [I(E)] ≥ I
(
P¯E ,∞
)
= I∞. (16)
(16) states that the minimum information leakage rate when
the EHD does not have a battery, and the harvested energy
state is random but known at the UP, is greater than or equal
to that which can be achieved with an infinite battery.
From the chain rule of mutual information, we have
I(X ;Y E) = I(X ;E) + I(X ;Y |E) = I(X ;Y |E), (17a)
I(X ;Y E) = I(X ;Y ) + I(X ;E|Y ), (17b)
where (17a) follows since X and E are independent of each
other. We have I(X ;E|Y ) ≥ 0, from the non-negativity of
mutual information; and thus, I(X ;Y ) ≤ I(X ;Y |E). From
Theorems 3 and 4, we have I0 ≤ I¯0.
In the next section we provide numerical results for both
the infinite and zero battery scenarios studied in this paper.
V. BINARY INPUT LOAD
We compare the minimum information leakage rates for the
infinite and zero battery scenarios in the binary input load
case, i.e., X = {0, 1}. X follows an independent Bernoulli
distribution with Pr{X = 1} = qx. We also consider a binary
energy harvesting process, i.e., E = {0, 1}, where Pr{Et =
1} = pe denotes the probability that the EHD harvests one
unit of energy.
If B = ∞, the minimum information leakage rate is given
by
I(pe,∞) =pe log2 pe − qx log2 qx
− (1− qx + pe) log2(1− qx + pe),
if pe ≤ qx, and I(pe,∞) = 0 otherwise.
When Bmax = 0, there are two scenarios. The first is that in
which the state information is known only by the EMU. We
Fig. 4. Comparison of the minimum information leakage rate in the
infinite and zero battery scenarios with binary input load and a binary energy
harvesting process. We set qx = 0.7, and plot the minimum information
leakage rate with respect to pe.
need to identify the optimal conditional distribution pY |X,E
with X − Y ≤ E, that minimizes I(X ;Y ). As mentioned
earlier we can set Y = {0, 1} without loss of optimality. In
this scenario, another parameter of interest is the probability of
using the energy available at the EHD when the input load is 1
and there is harvested energy, i.e., E = 1. It is possible to show
that the information leakage rate is minimized when we always
use the available energy when there is non-zero input load. In
this case the minimum information leakage rate is found to be
h(1−qx+pe ·qx)−qx ·h(pe), where h(·) is the binary entropy
function defined as h(p) = −p log2 p− (1− p) log2(1− p).
Finally, we consider the zero-battery case when the state is
known also by the UP. When the peak power constraint is e =
1, no information is leaked, whereas if e = 0, the input load
is known perfectly by the UP, leading to a leakage of H(X).
Hence, the minimum information leakage rate when the state
information is known by the UP is given by (1− pe) · h(qx).
In Fig. 4 we plot the minimum information leakage rate for
the three scenarios as a function of pe. As expected, the least
information leakage rate is achieved when Bmax = ∞, since
this condition is equivalent to having only an average power
constraint. The worst scenario is when B = 0 and the receiver
knows the state, denoted by I¯0. The information leakage rate
reduces significantly if the state is not known by the UP. The
difference between the solid and the long-dashed curves in the
figure illustrates the benefit of having a battery at the EHD.
We can see that the gain from the battery is much higher
when the harvesting rate is higher, i.e., when pe is high. This
is expected since when pe is low, there is less energy to be
stored for future time slots.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the information leakage in an SM system
by considering an EHD with an infinite or a zero capacity bat-
tery. In both cases, we have provided single letter expressions
for evaluating the minimum information leakage rate, which
indicates the optimal level of information theoretic privacy
that can be achieved. Considering the zero battery scenario,
we have also studied the information leakage rate when the
UP knows the exact amount of harvested energy in each time
slot. Finally, we have provided some simulation results for the
case of a binary input load. In our future work we plan to study
the minimum information leakage rate with a finite capacity
battery, which is a challenging problem due to the memory
introduced into the system by the existence of the battery.
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